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A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take 
into account agents’ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions 
representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented 
and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given. 
 
1. Introduction 
Power indices have become a very powerful instrument for study of electoral bodies 
and an institutional balance of power in these bodies [5-8, 11]. 
One of the main shortcomings mentioned almost in all publications on power indices 
is the fact that known indices do not take into account the preferences of agents [6,10]. 
Indeed, in construction of those indices, e.g., Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf power indices 
[4,12], all agents are assumed to be able to coalesce. Moreover, none of those indices 
evaluates to which extent the agents are free in their wishes to create coalition, how intensive 
are the connections inside one or another coalition. 
Consider an example. Let three parties A, B and C with 50, 49 and 1 sets, respectively, 
are presented in a parliament, and the voting rule is simple majority, i.e., 51 votes for. 
Then winning coalitions are A+B, A+C, A+B+C and A is pivotal in all coalitions, B is 
pivotal in the first coalition and C is pivotal in the second one. Banzhaf power index β for 
these parties is equal to1 
                                                          
1 Banzhaf power index is evaluated as 
,∑=
j
j
i
i b
bβ  
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5/1)()(   ,5/3)( === CBA βββ . 
Assume now that parties A and B never coalesce in pairwise coalition, i.e., coalition 
A+B is impossible. Let us, however, assume that the coalition A+B+C can be implemented, 
i.e. in the presence of `moderator' C parties A and B can coalesce. Then the winning coalitions 
are A+C and A+B+C, and A is pivotal in both coalitions while C is in one; B is pivotal in 
none of the winning coalitions. In this case 3/2)( =Aβ , 0)( =Bβ  and 3/1)( =Cβ , i.e., 
although B has almost half of the seats in the parliament, its power is equal to 0. 
If A and B never coalesce even in the presence of a moderator C, then the only 
winning coalition is A+C, in which both parties are pivotal. Then  21/)C()A( == ββ . 
Such situations are met in real political systems. For instance, Russian Communist 
Party in the second parliament (1997-2000) had had about 35% of seats, however, its power 
during that period was always almost equal to 0 [1]. 
We introduce here two new types of indices based on the idea similar to Banzhaf 
power index, however, taking into account agents' preferences to coalesce. 
In the first type the information is used about agents' preferences over other agents. 
These preferences are assumed to be linear orders. Since these preferences may not be 
symmetric, the desire of agent 1 to coalesce with agent 2 can be different than the desire of 
agent 2 to coalesce with agent 1. These indices take into account in a different way such 
asymmetry of preferences. 
 In the second type of power index the information about the intensity of preferences is 
taken into account as well, i.e., we extend the former type of power index to cardinal 
information about agents' preferences. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives main notions. In Section 3 we 
define and discuss `ordinal’ power indices. In Section 4 cardinal indices are introduced. In 
Section 5 we evaluate power distribution of groups and factions in the Russian Parlament in 
2000-2003 using some of new indices. Section 6 and 7 provides some axioms for the indices 
introduced.  
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2.  Main notions  
The set of agents is denoted as N,  },,1{ nN K= , n>1. A coalition ω  is the subset of  
N,  N⊆ω .  
We consider the situation when the decision of a body is made by voting procedure; 
agents who do not vote `yes’ vote against it, i.e., the abstention is not allowed. 
Each agent has a predefined number of votes, nivi ,,1  ,0 K=> . It is assumed that a 
quota q is predetermined and as a decision making rule the voting with quota is used, i.e., the 
decision is made if the number of votes for it is not less than q,  
qv
i
i ≥∑ . 
The model describes a voting by simple and qualified majority, voting with veto (as in 
the Security Council of UNO), etc. 
A coalition ω  is called winning if  the sum of  votes in the coalition is not less than q. 
An agent i is called pivotal in the coalition ω  if the coalition }{\ iω  is a loosing one. 
For such voting rule the set of all winning coalitions Ω  possesses the following 
properties: 
      Ωφ ∉ , 
Ω∈N , 
ΩωωωΩω ∈⇒⊇∈ '',  . 
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Sometime, one additional condition is applied as well 
,\N ΩωΩω ∉⇒∈  
which implies that  ⎡ ⎤2/nq ≥ , where ⎡ ⎤x  is the smallest integer greater or equal to x. 
To solve the problem stated above, two types of indices, ordinal and cardinal, are 
introduced. Both types are constructed on the following basis: the intensity of connection 
),i(f ω  of the agent with other members of  ω  is defined. Then for such agent i the value 
iχ  is evaluated as 
 
( )∑=
ω
ωχ ,,ifi  
i.e. the sum of intensities of connections of  i over those coalitions ω  in which i is pivotal. 
Naturally, other functions instead of summation can be considered. 
Then the power indices are constructed as 
( ) ∑=
j
j
ii χ
χα . 
The very idea of ( )iα  is the same as for Banzhaf index, with the difference that in 
Banzhaf index we evaluate the number of coalitions in which i is pivotal. 
The main question now is how to construct the intensity functions ),i(f ω . Below we 
give two ways how to construct those functions. 
Each agent i is assumed to have a linear order2 iP  revealing her preferences over other 
agents in the sense that i prefers to coalesce with agent j  than with agent k if iP  contains the 
pair (j, k). Obviously, iP  is defined on the cartesian product }){\(}){\( iNiN × . 
Since iP  is a linear order,  the rank ijp  of the agent  j in  iP  can be defined. We 
assume that Npij = -1 for the most preferable agent j in  iP . 
The value ijp  shows how many agents less preferable than j are in iP . For instance, if 
N={A,B,C,D} and DCBPA ff : , then  =ABP 3, =ACP  2 and =ADP 1. 
Using these ranks, one can constract different intensity functions. 
                                                          
2 i.e. irreflexive, transitive and connected binary relation. We often  denote it as f . 
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A second way of construction of  )( ω,if  is based on the idea that the values ijp  of 
connection of  i  with  j are predetermined somehow. In general, it is not assumed jiij pp = . 
Then the intensity function can be  constructed as above. 
Below we give four different ways how to construct  )( ω,if  in ordinal case and 
sixteen ways of construction of cardinal function  )( ω,if . 
 
 
3. Ordinal indices 
For each coalition ω  and each agent i construct now an intensity ),i(f ω  of 
connections in this coalition. In other words, f is a function which maps 
Ω×N (= N2 \{Ø}) into 1R , 1RN:f →×Ω . This very value ),i(f ω  is evaluated 
using the ranks of members of coalition. Several different ways to evaluate f using different 
information about agents’ preferences are provided: 
a) Intensity of i’s preferences. In this form only preferences of i’s agent over other 
agents are evaluated, i.e., 
∑
∈
+ =
ω ωω j
ijpif ),(  
b) Intensity of preferences for i. In this case consider the sum of ranks of  i  given by 
other members of coalition ω  
∑
∈
− =
ω ωω j
jipif ),(  
c) Average intensity with respect to i’s agent 
2
),(),(),( ωωω ififif
−+ +=  
d) Total positive average intensity. Consider any coalition ω  of size nk ≤ . Without 
loss of generality we can put },,1{ kK=ω . Then consider for each i ),( ωif +  and constract 
ω
ω
ω ω
∑
∈
+
+ = i
if
f
),(
)( , 
e) Total negative average intensity is defined similarly by the formula 
  6
ω
ω
ω ω
∑
∈
−
− = i
if
f
),(
)(  
f) Total average intensity is defined as 
ω
ω
ω ω
∑
∈= i
if
f
),(
)(  
It is worth emphasizing here that the intensities d) - f) do not depend on agent i, i.e., 
for any agent i in the following calculation of power indices we will assume that for any i in 
the coalition ω  the corresponding intensity is the same. 
Consider now several examples. 
Example 1. Let n=3, N={A, B, C}, =)(Aν 33, 33)()( == CB νν , q=50. Consider two 
preference profiles given in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1 
AP  BP  CP  
C C A 
B A B 
 
Table 2 
AP  BP  CP  
B C A 
C A B 
 
For both preference profiles there are three winning coalitions in which agents are 
pivotal. These coalitions are A+B, A+C and B+C. 
Let us calculate the functions f as above for each agent in each winning coalition. 
The preferences from Tables 1 and 2 can be re-written in the matrix form as 
  7
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
012
201
210
C
pij
        
        
        
   BA  
C
B
A
  
 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
0    1    2
2    0    1
1    2    0
   BA  
C
B
A
 '
C
p ij  
Now, for the profile given in Table 1 one can calculate the values of intensities a)-f) 
obtained by each agent i  in each winning coalition ω . These values  for the first preference 
profile is given in Table 3 and for the second one – in Table 4. 
           
 
Table 3. Intensity values for the first preference profile 
Table 4. Intensity values for the second preference profile 
 
),( ωif +  ),( ωif −  ),( ωif  )(ω+f  )(ω−f  )(ωf   
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
A+B ½ ½ – ½ ½ – ½ ½ – ½ ½ – ½ ½ – ½ ½ – 
A+C 1 – 1 1 – 1 1 – 1 1 – 1 1 – 1 1 – 1 
B+C – 1 ½ – ½ 1 – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ 
),( ωif +  ),( ωif −  ),( ωif  )(ω+f  )(ω−f  )(ωf   
A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C A B C 
A+B 1 ½ – ½ 1 – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – 
A+C ½ – 1 1 – ½ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ 
B+C – 1 ½ – ½ 1 – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ – ¾ ¾ 
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Using these intensity functions one can define now the corresponding power indices 
)i(α . Let i   be a pivotal agent in a winning coalition ω . Denote as iχ  the number equal to 
the value of the intensity function for a given coalition ω  and agent i. Then the power index 
is defined as follows 
∑ ∑
∑
∈
=
Nj
j
j
i
i
i
ωω
ωω
χ
χ
α
in   pivotal is  
,           
in   pivotal is  
,           
 
  
)(  
As we already mentioned this index is similar to the Banzhaf index. The difference is 
that iχ  in the Banzhaf index is equal to 1, in the case under study iχ  represents some 
intensity value. 
The indices )(iα  will be denoted as )(,),( 61 ii αα K .  
Let us evaluate now the values )()( ⋅−⋅ 61 αα  for all agents for the preference profile 
from Table 1. 
The agent A (as well as agents B and C) is pivotal in two coalitions; the sum of the 
values ),( ωif +  for each i is equal to 3/2. Then 
.)()(
3
1
2/32/32/3
2/3)( 111 CBA ααα ===++=  
The value )(2 ⋅α  is evaluated differently. The sum of values ),( ωif −  from Table 3 for 
all i and ω  is equal to 9/2. However, for A ∑ =
ω
ω 2/3),(Af , ∑ =
ω
ω 1),(Bf  and 
∑ =
ω
ω 2),(Cf . Then 
3
1
9
3)(2 ==Aα ; 9
2)(2 =Bα  and  9
4)(2 =Cα . 
The values of the indices 1α – 6α  for both preference profiles are given in Table 5 as 
well as the values of Banzhaf index β  
Consider now another example. 
Example 2.  Let N={A, B, C, D, E}, each agent has one vote, q=3 and the preferences 
of agents are given in Table 6. 
The values of indices 2α  – 4α  are given in Table 7. 
Note that 1α  is equal to the Banzahalf index, which for this case gives 
5/1)(  =∈∀ iNi β . 
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First profile (Table 1) Second profile (Table 2)  
A B C A B C 
1α  1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 
2α  1/3 2/9 4/9 1/3 1/3 1/3 
3α  1/3 5/18 7/18 1/3 1/3 1/3 
4α  1/3 5/18 7/18 1/3 1/3 1/3 
5α  1/3 5/18 7/18 1/3 1/3 1/3 
6α  1/3 5/18 7/18 1/3 1/3 1/3 
β  1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 
Table 5. Power indices values 
 
AP  BP  CP  DP  EP  rank 
B A D A B 4 
C C A B A 3 
D D B C D 2 
E E E E C 1 
Table 6. Preferences of agents for  N={A, B, C, D, E}. 
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 A B C D E 
2α  0.28 0.26 0.18 0.2 0.08 
3α  0.24 0.23 0.19 0.2 0.14 
4α  0.22 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.17 
Table 7. The values of the indices 2α – 4α  for Example 2. 
Example 3. Consider the case when 3 parties A, B and C have 50, 49 and 1 seats, 
respectively. Assume that decision making rule is simple majority, i.e. 51 votes. Then  the 
winning coalitions are A+B, A+C and A+B+C. Note that A is pivotal in all three coalitions, B 
and C are pivotal in one coalition each. Then 5/3)( =Aβ , 5/1)()( == CB ββ . 
Consider now the case with the preferences of agents given below: BC:PA f ; 
BC:PA f  and BA:PC f . 
Then the values of 1α  and 2α  (constructed by ),( ωif +  and ),( ωif −  are as follows 
8/1)(   ,5/1)(    ,8/5)( 111 === CBA ααα , 
and the values of 2α  are equal to 1α . 
 Consider another preference profile: BC:PA f , BC:PA f ; BA:PC f , i.e., 
only agent C changes her preferences. Then one can easily evaluate that 
7/1)( )(    ,7/5)( 111 === CBA ααα ;  19/10)(2 =Aα , 19/3)(2 =Bα , 19/6)(2 =Cα . 
 
 
4. Cardinal  indices 
Assume now that the desire of party i  to coalesce with party j  is given as real number 
ijp , njip
j
ij ,,1,  ,1 K==∑ . In general, it is not assumed that jiij pp = . 
One can call the value ijp  as an intensity of connection of i  with  j. It may be 
interpreted as, for instance, a probability for i to form a coalition with j. 
We define now several intensity functions 
a) average intensity of  i is connection with other members of coalition ω  
  11
;),( ωω
ω
∑
∈+ = j
ijp
if  
b) average intensity of connection of other members of coalition ω  with i  
;
p
),i(f j
ji
ωω
ω
∑
∈− =  
c) average intensity for i 
));,(),((
2
1),( ωωω ififif −+ +=  
d) average positive intensity in ω  
,
),(
)( ω
ω
ω ω
∑
∈
+
+ = i
if
f  
e) average negative intensity in ω  
,
),(
)( ω
ω
ω ω
∑
∈
−
− = i
if
f  
f) average  intensity in ω  
,
),(
)( ω
ω
ω ω
∑
∈= i
if
f  
In contrast to ordinal case now we can introduce several new intensity 
functions: 
g) minimal intensity of i's connections 
ijj
pif min),(min =+ ω ; 
h) maximal intensity of i's connections 
ijj
pif max),(max =+ ω ; 
i) maximal fluctuation of  i's connections 
)maxmin(
2
1),( ijjijjmf ppif +=ω  
 j) minimal intensity of connections of other agents in ω  with i 
jij
pif min),(min =− ω ; 
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 k) maximal  intensity of connections of other agents in ω  with i 
jij
pif max),(max =− ω  
l) s-mean intensity of i's connections with other agents in ω  
s
j
s
ijsm pif ∑=+ ωω 1),( ; 
m) s-mean intensity of connections of other agents in ω  with i 
s
j
s
jism pif ∑=+ ωω 1),( ; 
n) max min intensity 
ijji
pf minmax)(minmax =ω ; 
o) min max intensity 
jiji
pf maxmin)(maxmin =ω ; 
p) maximal fluctuation 
))()((
2
1)( maxminminmax ωωω fffmf +=  
Note that the intensity functions in the cases d)–f), n)–p) do not depend on agent 
herself but only on coalition ω . 
Now the corresponding power indices can be  define as above, i.e., 
 
∑ ∑
∑
∈
=
Nj
j
i
i
i
i
ωω
ωω
ωχ
χ
α
in  pivotal is        
 winning,is             
in  pivotal is 
 winning,is            
card
)( 
  
)( , 
where χ  is one of the above intensity functions. 
 
 Example 4. Let N={A,B,C,D},  each voter has only one vote, the quota is equal to q=3, 
and the matrix ijp  is given in Table 8. In Table 9 the power indices are given for the cases 
a), b), e), h). 
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 A B C D 
A  0.7 0.2 0.1 
B 0.3  0.5 0.2 
C 0.1 0.7  0.2 
D 0.7 0.2 0.1  
 Table 8. Matrix ijp  for Example 3 
 
 
 
 
A B C D 
)aα  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
)bα  0.27 0.40 0.20 0.13 
)eα  0.25 0.27 0.24 0.23 
)hα  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Table 9. Some cardinal indices for Example 3 
 
 5. Evaluation for Russian Parliament 
 We will study now a distribution of power among factions in the third  Russian 
Parliament (1999-2003) using these new indices. 
 The matrix ijp  is constructed using the consistency index; the latter (the index of 
consistency of positions of two groups) is constructed as  
  
( ) ( )2211
21
21 1,,1,max
1,
qqqq
qq
qqc −−
−−= . 
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where 1q  and 2q  be the share of “ay” votes in two groups of MPs [1]. 
 We consider the value of consistency index as the value of intensity of connections 
between agents i and j. Then we are in cardinal framework, and one can use one of the indices 
introduced in the previous section. 
 On Fig. 1 the values of )aα  index are given for the Russian Parliament from 2000 to 
2003 on the monthly basis. It can be readily seen that index α  gives lower values for 
Communist Party (sometimes up to 3%) and higher values for Edinstvo (up to 1%). It is 
interesting to note that Liberal-Democrats (Jirinovski’s Party) had had almost equal values by 
both indices, which corresponds to the well-known flexibility of that party position. 
 Let us note that different ways to use the index α  are possible. For instance, 
following the approach from [1], we may assume that if the consistency value for two factions 
is less than some threshold value δ , then parties do not coalesce, i.e., 0=ijp . 
 
 5. Axiomatic construction of a cardinal intensity function 
Now we will try to axiomatize a construction of cardinal intensity function. 
First, we define an intensity function  depending on intensities ijp  of connections of i 
with other members of coalition ω , i.e., if },,1{ mK=ω , nm ≤ , 
),,,,,,,,,,,(),( 1221111 mmimimmi pppppppfif KKKKK=ω  
As it is seen, the intensity function for i depends not only of i’s connections with other 
members of coalition, but depends also of connections of other members among themselves. 
 However, we will restrict this function in a way which is similar to independence of 
irrelevant alternatives [3]: ),( ωif  will depend on connections of agent i with other members 
of coalition ω  only, i.e.,  
).,,(),( 1 imii ppfif K=ω  
For the sake of simplicity we put  0≥ωijp  for all j,i  and ∑
∈
∀
ω
ω
j
ijpi  =1.  
I would like to emphasize that in this formulation the sum of ωijp  is equal to 1 in each 
ω , i.e., now connections are defined by 12 −N  matrices ωijp  for each coalition ω . 
 Consider several axioms which reasonable function ),( ωif  should satisfy to. 
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 Axiom 1. For any m – tuple of values ),,( 1 imi pp K  there exist a function ),( ωif  such 
that 1),(0 ≤≤ ωif , f is continious differentiable function of each of its arguments. 
Axiom 2. If 0=ijp  for any j, then ),( ωif =0. 
Axiom 3. (Monotonicity). A value of ),( ωif  increases if any value ijp  increases, and 
a value of  ),( ωif  decreases if ijp  decreases. Moreover, equal changes in intensities ijp  lead 
to equal changes of ),( ωif . This means that 
i
ij
i
p
f μ=∂
∂
    for any   j 
 and 
0=∂
∂
lj
i
p
f
    for any   il ≠ . 
 Then the following theorem holds 
 Theorem. An intensity function ),i(f ω  satisfies Axioms 1–3 iff it is represented in 
the form 
ωω
∑
= j
ijp
),i(f . 
 Proof is similar to the proof of the theorem from [9] given in the framework of 
probabilistic social choice and hence is omitted. 
 An axiomatic characterization of other types of intensity functions is still an open 
problem. 
 
 7. Axioms for power indices 
 We introduce several axioms, which any reasonable power index should satisfy to. 
First, we call a voting situation a four-tuple }P,v,q,N{
r
, where N is a set of agents, 
1 , >= nnN , q is a quota, ),,( 1 nvvv K=  is a set of votes which agents possess, Pr  is a 
preference profile, where each agent Ni∈  has a preference (linear order) iP  over }{\ iN  or 
preference matrix ijp . 
Axiom 1. Under a given quota rule for any agent Ni∈  there exists an intensity profile 
P
r
 such that 0)( >iα . 
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In words, for no agent it is known in advance, independently of agents’ preferences, 
that her power is equal to 0. 
 Axiom 2. Consider two voting situations }P,v,q,N{
r
 and }P,'v,q,N{
r
. Let 
NA∈∃  s.t. )()(' AvAv ≥ , and NB∈∀ , AB ≠ , )()(' BvBv = . Then )()(' AA αα ≥ . 
Assume that for a given distribution of votes and a given preference profile we 
evaluate power distribution among agents. Then we increase the number of votes for a given 
agent A, keeping the votes of other agents as before. Then Axiom 2 states that voting power 
of A in new situation should be not less than before. 
 Axiom 3. (Symmetry) Let η  be a one-to-one correspondence of N to N. Then 
),,(),,( )()1(1 nn ηη ααααη KK = . 
 Axiom 3 states that power of agents does not depend of their names, i.e., the procedure 
of evaluation of power distribution must treat agents in a similar way. 
 Axiom 4. Let  Ni∈  be pivotal in no winning coalition ω . Then 0)( =iα . 
 It is usual axiom in voting power models (in fact, in game – theoretic models – see 
[12]): a dummy player has power equal 1 to 0. 
Axiom 5’. First Monotonicity Axiom (FMA). Consider  two voting situations 
],,,[ PvqN  and ]',,,[ PvqN . Let for some i and any ik ≠  'kk PP =  holds. Let additionally for 
some j ij
'
ij pp > holds. Then )()(' jj αα ≥ . 
This axiom can be explained in a simple way: all preferences except i’s are the same 
in two profiles; in i'th preference the evaluation of j is higher in new profile than in the old 
one. Then the power of j should not be less in new voting situation (with 'P ). 
Axiom 5”. Second Monotonicity Axiom (SMA). Consider  two voting situations 
],,,[ PvqN  and ]',,,[ PvqN . Let for two agents i and j  )()( ji αα ≥  holds, where )(iα  is the 
voting power of i in the first voting situation. Let 'P  is such that for any lk ≠  'kk PP =  holds, 
and in the preferences of l’s agent  
ljliljli pppp −>− ''  
holds. 
 Then )(')(' ji αα ≥  (weak version of SMA) or )()(' ji αα >  (strong version of SMA), 
where )(' iα  is the voting power of i with  respect to second voting situation. 
  17
 In words, let power of i is not less than the power of j with respect to first voting 
situation. Let 'P  is such that for any agent but l  new preferences of agents coincide with old 
preferences, and in l’s preference the relative position of i with respect to j is higher in  'lp  
than in lp . Then the voting power of  i should be not less than that of j in new voting situation 
(weak version) or even must be greater than that of j (strong version). 
 Axiom 6.  Let  'P  be an intensity matrix such that   ijij kpp ='    for every nji ,,1, K= . 
 Then  )()(' ii αα = , where 'α  is the power vector obtained from 'P . 
 Axiom 6 deals with cardinal power indices. It says that voting power of agents does 
not change under the transformation of scale of intensities in the form 
,
'
ijij kpp =  
i.e., when intensities multiply to the same constant k. 
 It is possible to formulate axioms similar to those from Section 5 and prove the 
theorem similar to the given above but for α -indices. However, it will be interesting to 
analize how the axioms from this Section provide an axiomatic characterization of α  indices. 
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